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The UK is well ahead of the US and the EU in its use of fiscal
rules
Much of the speculation leading up to the Chancellor ’s Autumn Statement, as well as the
debate which followed it, has centered around George Osborne’s fiscal rules. In this post
Simon Wren-Lewis examines the government’s surviving fiscal rule and some of the
difficulties which surround it. 
In one area macroeconomic policy in the UK is well ahead of  the US or the Eurozone: the
use of  f iscal rules. The US seems to pref er clif f s to rules – yes, I know that is a cheap jibe,
but you know what I mean. In the Eurozone f iscal rules now come in packs, the individual
parts of  which are of  variable quality and may not be consistent with each other. By contrast, the
surviving UK f iscal rule (or ‘mandate’) makes some limited sense, as did Gordon Brown’s predecessors. It
says the government should achieve structural (cyclically adjusted) balance, excluding investment
spending, within f ive years – where that f ive year period rolls f orward.
What is good about this rule? Its main advantage is that, by having a rolling target, nothing is adjusted
too quickly. One thing that stands out f rom the literature is that, as long as you are able to sell debt,
f iscal adjustments should be slow, and the government’s def icit should act as a shock absorber. The
analogy with consumption smoothing is pretty close. Now it is true that a rolling target could allow a
government to keep delaying adjustment, but that is hardly a problem right now.
Two additional f eatures of  the UK rule are the use of  the cyclically adjusted def icit and the exclusion of
investment. Although cyclical adjustment gets talked about a lot, f or this particular rule it would in normal
times be largely irrelevant, because we would expect to have a zero output gap in f ive years time anyway.
Right now it is not irrelevant, but I will have more to say about the current conjuncture below. Whether it
is right to exclude spending on investment is a dif f icult question, which I will leave f or another post.
Where the rule is more problematic is the f ocus on the def icit, and the idea that ‘balance’ f or the current
def icit is a meaningf ul target. Ult imately we are concerned about government debt. We want to stop debt
rising relative to GDP, and then we want to get it down. The speed at which that is done will imply a path
f or def icits, but these def icits will almost certainly be varying over t ime, and there is no magic in zero (i.e.
balance). The rule that an economist would naturally think of  (and which is commonly used in academic
work) is to adjust instruments in proportion to the dif f erence between actual debt and its target level.
However, a zero def icit over the medium run will imply a reduction in debt (as the OBR shows), so at least
its moving us in the right direction.
While f or the macroeconomist as scientist there is plenty of  scope f or exploring these issues, I think
they miss the two major problems that the macroeconomist as engineer has to deal with. The f irst is
whether we are designing rules f or a (roughly) benevolent government, or f or a government that departs
f rom benevolence in particular ways. Second, good rules will inevitably involve making guesses about the
f uture, and many people f ind it dif f icult to get their head around this.
As an example, we only need to look at the reaction to the Autumn Statement in the UK. Whether the
measures taken by the Chancellor are suf f icient to meet his rule depends on where you think the
economy will be in f ive years time. Given the current uncertainty about the output gap, the Chancellor
could be being too optimistic or embarking on unnecessary austerity. For instance see Ian Mulheirn on
the implications of  alternative assumptions. Commentators, particularly those polit ical commentators f or
whom the long run is af ter the next election, but also in my experience some macroeconomists, yearn f or
rules or targets that are not conditional in this way. Why cannot we have something straightf orward like
an inf lation target? I mention all this not because I think these concerns are legit imate (I have argued
against unconditional inf lation targets), but because if  f iscal rules are to command public conf idence,
they may need to take this into account. Perhaps concerns like these explain why most rules f ocus on
def icits rather than debt.
However, there is one point that has to be made if  we are discussing f iscal rules in relation to current
events, and that is that all the discussion above presumes that monetary policy is unconstrained, and in
particular that interest rates are not at the Zero Lower Bound (ZLB). This is a very f amiliar point, that
Paul Krugman has made again and again: at the ZLB things are very dif f erent. Monetary policy has lost
much of  its power, and it has certainly lost its claim to predictability and superiority. We need f iscal policy
to help in eliminating excess supply. In this situation, if  we need a f iscal rule at all it  is more likely to look
like a Taylor rule than a rule involving a debt or def icit target. However, when there is no danger of  hitt ing
the ZLB, there is no need f or f iscal policy to be concerned about the output gap or inf lation at all – if  we
are talking about an economy with a f loating exchange rate. The conventional assignment can apply.
Some f iscal rules attempt to address this point by having terms in both debt stabilisation and output gap
stabilisation. Now while this might make sense under f ixed exchange rates, it is a pointless compromise
under f lexible rates. If  the ef f ectiveness of  monetary policy is quite dif f erent at the ZLB, then optimal
f iscal policy is also bound to be very dif f erent at the ZLB. So the main problem with the UK government’s
f iscal mandate has nothing to do with cyclical adjustment or any of  the other things discussed above. It
is just inappropriate f or the situation we are now in.
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